Abstract. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. On the one hand, the twin Diffie-Hellman (twin DH) problem proposed by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup is extended to the n-Diffie-Hellman (n-DH) problem for an arbitrary integer n, and this new problem is shown to be at least as hard as the ordinary DH problem. Like the twin DH problem, the n-DH problem remains hard even in the presence of a decision oracle that recognizes solution to the problem. On the other hand, observe that the double-size key in the Cash et al. twin DH based encryption scheme can be replaced by two separated keys each for one entity, that results in a 2-party encryption scheme which holds the same security feature as the original scheme but removes the key redundancy. This idea is further extended to an n-party case, which is also known as n-out-of-n encryption. As examples, a variant of ElGamal encryption and a variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE have been presented; both of them have proved to be CCA secure under the computational DH assumption and the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption respectively, in the random oracle model. The two schemes are efficient, due partially to the size of their ciphertext, which is independent to the value n.
Introduction
In EUROCRYPT 2008 [6] , Cash, Kiltz and Shoup proposed a new computational problem and named it the twin Diffie-Hellman (twin DH) problem with the meaning that given a random triple of the form (X 1 , X 2 , Y ) ∈ G 3 for a cyclic group G, compute dh(X 1 , Y ) and dh(X 2 , Y ), where dh is the DH function. They also proposed the strong twin DH problem, which is the twin DH problem under the condition that an adversary is given access to a corresponding decision twin DH oracle. They proved that the strong twin DH problem is as hard as the (ordinary) DH problem, i.e., given a random pair of the form (X, Y ) ∈ G 2 , compute dh(X, Y ).
The motivation of their introducing the (strong) twin DH problem is the following: it is well-known that there exist many cryptographic constructions (e.g., the Diffie-Hellman non-interactive key exchange protocol [17] and the CramerShoup encryption scheme [13] ) which are based on the DH problem, but security of these constructions can only be proved under the strong DH problem, i.e., the adversary is given access to a decision DH oracle. The reason is that in the security proof, the simulator need the help of the decision oracle to keep the simulation coherent throughout the game. By employing the strong twin DH problem in these constructions, they can successfully prove that the modified constructions are secure under the DH problem, since the strong twin DH problem implies the DH problem. This is a clever trick.
However, their method is not cost free. In order to employ the twin DH problem, their modified construction is "a bit less efficient" than the original one; specifically, the modified construction doubles the key of the original one. For example, in their twin Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme, a master key of a Key Generation Center (KGC) is twin private/public key pairs, written as ((x 1 , X 1 ), (x 2 , X 2 )), instead of one (x, X) in the original IBE scheme, and accordingly, an user's secret key associated with this user's identity id (served as a public key of the user) is also two secret values written as (S 1 , S 2 ), each of which is computed under one master key pair. Therefore, a key redundancy is the cost of tighter security reduction.
Can we use this key redundancy to achieve some extra useful function without imposing an efficiency penalty? Observe that in their twin IBE scheme, the identity value id in computing S 1 does not have to be the same as in computing S 2 ; the two private/public master key pairs (x 1 , X 1 ) and (x 2 , X 2 ) can each belong to an individual KGC. With this slight modification, a user can have two independent identities each associated with one KGC. For example, Alice has her working email address associated with her employer as one KGC and her passport number associated with the government of her country as another KGC. These two KGCs are independent authorities, and do not necessarily have any trust relation or communication between them. Furthermore, the number of the identities and KGCs in the IBE scheme may not be restricted to two 1 . This observation leads to the main contributions of our paper that the twin DH problem can be extended to the n-DH problem for an arbitrary number n, which enables us to build an efficient encryption scheme with multiple public keys and an efficient IBE scheme with multiple KGCs and identities. This type of encryption is also known as n-out-of-n encryption, in which a given message is encrypted under a set of n individual public keys, and the associated decryption operation makes use of the n corresponding secret keys. It is relevant to other well-known encryption primitives with multi-receivers, such as broadcast encryption [5, 16] (known as 1-out-of-n encryption) and threshold cryptosystem [15] (known as t-out-of-n encryption). The latter has an attractive application, namely attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20, 3] . Compared with the well-explored t-out-of-n threshold encryption or ABE schemes, e.g. using a secret sharing technique [24] , an n-out-of-n encryption scheme seems a naive solution. But we think it is worthy studying this solution properly since it has the advantage of simplicity in both algorithm implementation and security analysis.
More specifically, there are a number of contributions in this paper. Here we describe a brief overview of each contribution individually.
The n-DH problem. We present a modification of the twin DH problem [6] by extending the number of the (ordinary) DH instances from 2 to an arbitrary integer n, and name it the n-DH problem. Intuitively, the n-DH problem is that given a random n+1 tuple of the form (
where dh is the DH function. We also present the strong n-DH problem which is the n-DH problem under the condition that an adversary is given access to a corresponding decision n-DH oracle. We prove that the strong n-DH problem is just as hard as the DH problem.
The n-BDH problem. We present a modification of the twin Bilinear-DH (twin BDH) problem [6, 12] . by extending the number of the (ordinary) BDH instances from 2 to an arbitrary integer n, and name it the n-BDH problem. Intuitively, the n-BDH problem is that given a random 2n + 1 tuple of the form
where bdh is the BDH function. We also present the strong n-BDH problem which is the n-BDH problem under the condition that an adversary is given access to a corresponding decision n-BDH oracle. We prove that the strong n-BDH problem is just as hard as the BDH problem.
Concept and example of an MPKE scheme. We formalize the concept of an n-out-of-n public key encryption scheme and call it a Multiple Public Key Encryption (MPKE) scheme. MPKE schemes can be used in those applications, which requires that either a decryptor must be in the possession of n private keys (e.g., each can be bound with an particular attribute) or that n decryptors (each with an individual key) must work together, in order to decrypt a given ciphertext. As a concrete MPKE example, we present a new modification of the hashed ElGamal encryption scheme [1] , and name it the n-ElGamal encryption scheme. Based on the strong n-DH assumption (that implies based on the ordinary DH assumption), we prove that the n-ElGamal encryption scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle [2] .
Concept and example of an MIBE scheme. We formalize the concept of a Multiple Identity-Based Encryption (MIBE) scheme, which is an MPKE scheme with the identity-based key setting under the condition that the n KGCs, each generating a private key from an identity value, can be independent to each other. This type of IBE schemes has already been introduced in the literature, e.g. [7, 10, 11] . To the best of our knowledge, the security of the schemes in [7, 10, 11] have not been rigorously analyzed. As a concrete MIBE example, we present a new modification of the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4] and name it the n-IBE scheme. Based on the strong n-BDH assumption (that implies based on the ordinary BDH assumption), we prove that the n-IBE scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle [2] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe definitions of the (strong) n-BDH assumption in Section 2 and of the (strong) n-BDH assumption in Section 3. After that, we present definitions of security models for MPKE schemes and MIBE schemes in Section 4, followed by a concrete MPKE scheme with a rigorous security analysis in Section 5, and a concrete MIBE scheme in Section 6 (due to the limited space, its rigorous security analysis is in the full paper [8] ). We end the paper with conclusions and some open questions for future work in Section 7.
The n-DH Assumption
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and with generator g, and let dh be the DH function defined as
Recall that the DH assumption states it is hard to compute dh(X, Y ) given random X, Y ∈ G. We define the n-DH function function by
We also define a corresponding n-DH predicate by
The n-DH assumption states that it is hard to compute ndh(X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ) given random X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ∈ G. Accordingly, the strong n-DH assumption states that it is hard to compute ndh(X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ) given random X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ∈ G along with access to the predicate ndhp(
We have the following theorem to address the relation between the DH assumption and the (strong) n-DH assumption:
Theorem 2.1 (DH via strong n-DH). The (ordinary) DH assumption holds if and only if the strong n-DH assumption holds.
It is clear that the DH assumption implies the n-DH assumption. We now prove that the DH assumption implies the strong n-DH assumption. 
xi for i ∈ {1} ∪ I, then the probability that the truth value of
does not agree with the truth value of
is at most (1/p) n−1 ; moreover if (2) holds, then (1) certainly holds.
Proof. Observe that s i = r i x 1 + x i for i ∈ I where I = {2, . . . , n}. It is not difficult to verify that each X i for i ∈ I is uniformly distributed over G, and that all X i for i ∈ {1} ∪ I and r i for i ∈ I are mutually independent, from which the items 1 and 2 follow. To prove the item 3, condition on fixed values of X i for i ∈ {1} ∪ I. In the resulting conditional probability space, each r i for i ∈ I is uniformly distributed over Z p , while all (2) does not hold, we show that (1) holds with probability at most (1/p) n−1 . We take the n − 1 equations of (1) separately. Each of them uses the same argument as in the proof of the trapdoor test of [6] . Observe that (1) is equivalent to
Let us take a look at the (i − 1) th equation of (3). We can see that ifẐ 1 =Ŷ x1 andẐ i =Ŷ xi no matter whether the other equations of (2) holds or not, then this equation certainly does not hold. This leaves us with the caseẐ 1 =Ŷ x1 . In this case, the left hand side of the equation is a random element of G (since r i is uniformly distributed over Z p ), but the right hand side is a fixed element of G. So this equation holds with probability 1/p. (3) holds if and only if n − 1 different equations all hold. Now, we argue that these n−1 equations are mutually independent, because each r i for i ∈ I is uniformly distributed over Z p , therefore, the probability that (3) holds is at most (1/p) n−1 .
Using this trapdoor test as a tool, we can prove Theorem 2.1. Let B be a DH adversary. Denote its advantage by AdvDH B,G with the meaning of the probability that B computes dh(X, Y ), given random X, Y ∈ G. Let A be a strong n-DH adversary. Denote its advantage by AdvnDH A,G with the meaning of the probability that A computes ndh( 
holds; if this does not hold, B outputs "failure", and otherwise, B outputs Z 1 . Provide the oracle simulation is perfect, adversary A's view is identical to its view in the real environment. It remains to calculate the accuracy of the trapdoor test. Note that the probability of the trapdoor test returning a wrong decision result for a query is at most (1/p) n−1 , and this happens at most Q d times. Therefore the trapdoor test can simulate the decision oracle perfectly with probability at least 1 − Q d /p n−1 . Theorem 2.3 follows immediately.
The n-BDH Assumption
In groups equipped with a pairing e : G × G → G T where G and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p and G is with generate g, we recall that the BDH function is defined as
The BDH assumption states that computing bdh(X, Y, Z) for random X, Y, Z ∈ G is a hard problem. The strong BDH assumption [21] states that the BDH problem remains hard even with the help of a corresponding decision oracle. Note that for the purpose of describing our main results as simply as possible, without loss of the generality, we make use of symmetric pairings (also called Type-1 pairings). It does not mean that our proposed assumptions and schemes only work with symmetric pairings. Without changing the main results of this paper, this symmetric pairing representation can be modified to the asymmetric pairing one (i.e., e : G 1 × G 2 → G T where G 1 , G 2 and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p). More specifically, one may use Type-2 pairings, where there is an efficiently computable group isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 mapping g 2 ∈ G 2 to g 1 ∈ G 1 , or Type-3 pairings, where there is no known efficiently computable group isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 2 mapping g 2 to g 1 . We refer readers to [19] for the details of these three types of pairings.
We define the n-BDH function by
We also define a corresponding n-BDH predicate by
The n-BDH assumption states that it is hard to compute nbdh(
We have the following result to address the relation between the BDH assumption and the (strong) n-BDH assumption:
Theorem 3.1 (BDH via strong n-BDH). The (ordinary) BDH assumption holds if and only if the strong n-BDH assumption holds.
It is clear that the BDH assumption implies the n-BDH assumption. We prove that the BDH assumption implies the strong n-BDH assumption. Again, by following the technique developed in [6] , we first create a trapdoor test. 
Theorem 3.2 (Trapdoor Test for n-BDH
is at most (1/p) n−1 ; moreover if (5) holds, then (4) certainly holds. 
In addition, if B does not output "failure", then its output is correct with probability at least
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3. Again, due to the limited space, we have put this proof in the full paper [8] .
Definitions of MPKE and MIBE
In this section we present formal definitions of a Multiple Public Key Encryption (MPKE) scheme and of a Multiple Indentity-Based Encryption (MIBE) scheme, including their security notion: chosen ciphertext security, which are based on the usual definitions of chosen ciphertext security for a public key encryption scheme [22] and an identity-based encryption scheme [4] . Recall that these two types of encryption schemes are n-out-of-n encryption schemes. In the security model an adversary is not allowed to corrupt any decryption key from the entirely n set of the keys.
Multiple Public Key Encryption
A Multiple Public Key Encryption scheme (say MPKE), with a security parameter 1 κ and associated system parameters params (include descriptions of a finite key space K, a finite message space M, and a finite ciphertext space C), is specified by three algorithms: KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt: KeyGen: takes 1 κ and params as input, and generates a set n of public and secret key pairs, written as (pk i , sk i ) ∈ K for i = 1, . . . , n. We also denote the n public keys by pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) and the n secret keys by sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ).
Encrypt: takes as input params, pk, and a message M ∈ M. It returns a ciphertext C ∈ C. Decrypt: takes as input params, a ciphertext C ∈ C and sk, and returns M .
These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, namely when (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ , params), then ∀M ∈ M : Decrypt(params, C, sk) = M where C = Encrypt(params, pk, M).
Chosen ciphertext security of the scheme MPKE is defined by the following attack game, played between a challenger CH and an adversary A:
Setup. The challenger takes a security parameter 1 κ and associated params, and runs the KeyGen algorithm. It gives the resulting pk together with params to A, and keeps the corresponding sk to itself.
Phase 1.
A makes a number of decryption queries to the challenger, where the input to each query is a ciphertext, sayĈ. To answer such a query, the challenger decryptsĈ and sends the result to A. These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query may depend on the replies to previous queries. Challenge. Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 ∈ M on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts M β , and sends the resulting ciphertext C * as the challenge to A.
Phase 2.
A issues more decryption queries as in Phase 1, but with the restriction thatĈ = C * . These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase 1.
Guess.
Finally, A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if β = β .
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-CCA adversary. We define adversary A's advantage over the scheme MPKE by AdvCCA A,MPKE (κ) = Pr[β = β ] − 1 2 . The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. When we analyze the scheme MPKE in the random oracle model, then hash functions are modeled as random oracles, and both the challenger and adversary are given access to the random oracles in the above attack game. In that case, we write AdvCCA 
Multiple Identity-Based Encryption
A Multiple Identity-Based Encryption scheme, denoted by MIBE, is specified by four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt:
Setup: takes a security parameter 1 κ , and returns system parameters params and a set n of master public and secret key pairs, written as (mpk i , msk i ) for i = 1, . . . , n; without loss of generality, each key pair (mpk i , msk i ) is associated with the i-th of a set n KGCs. We denote the n master public keys by mpk = (mpk 1 , . . . , mpk n ) and the n master secret keys by msk = (msk 1 , . . . , msk n ). The parameters params include a description of a finite message space M, and a description of a finite ciphertext space C. Extract: takes as input params, a master key msk i and an arbitrary identity id i ∈ {0, 1} * for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It returns a secret key sk i . By repeating the Extract algorithm n times with different i values, one can obtain sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) associated with id = (id 1 , . . . , id n ). Note that msk i and id i do not have to uniquely match to each other. Theoretically speaking, any arbitrary identity can bind with any master key, and therefore, the case id i = id j for i = j is allowed. Encrypt: takes as input params, pk, id and a message M ∈ M. It returns a ciphertext C ∈ C. Decrypt: takes as input params, a ciphertext C ∈ C and sk, and returns M . When we analyze such a scheme MIBE in the random oracle model, we write AdvCCA 
The n-ElGamal Encryption Scheme
In this section, we present details of the n-ElGamal encryption scheme. The scheme makes use of a hash function H and a symmetric cipher SE = (E, D) . Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and with generator g. A set of public keys for this scheme is denoted by a n-tuple of random group elements pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), with a set of corresponding secret keys denoted by sk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where X i = g xi for i ∈ I and I = (1, . . . , n). To encrypt a message m ∈ M, one chooses a random y ∈ Z p , and computes
The ciphertext is (Y, c). Decryption works accordingly: given (Y, c) and secret key sk, one computes
As mentioned earlier, the size of the ciphertext in this scheme is independent to the number of public and secret keys n. Like the twin ElGamal encryption scheme [6] , the scheme does not add redundancy in the ciphertext in order to achieve CCA security, as in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [18] . Following the arguments in [1, 6, 14] , we now show that the n-ElGamal encryption scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attack, under the strong n-DH assumption. By Theorem 2.1, the same holds under the (ordinary) DH assumption. Formally speaking, we denote the n-ElGamal encryption scheme MPKE ndh , and analyze security of this scheme with the following theorem, under the security model previously defined in Section 4.1. 
Proof. We proceed with a sequence of games. Game 0. This is the original chosen ciphertext attack game for a MPKE scheme as defined in Section 4.1. Let S 0 be the event that β = β in this game. Setup: To start the game, the challenger generates the secret key set sk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and their corresponding public key set pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). The challenger gives pk to the adversary. 
Guess:
The adversary A outputs its guess β for β. That finishes the description of Game 0. Despite the syntactic difference, it is clear that
Game 1. We now describe Game 1, which is the same as Game 0, but with the following difference: the challenger will abort the game if the adversary query H at Y, Z 1 , . . . , Z n either in Phase 1 or Phase 2. Everything else remains exactly the same as Game 0. Let S 1 be the event that β = β in Game 1 and F be the event that the adversary queries the random oracle at Y, Z 1 , . . . Z n in Game 1.
Since Game 0 and Game 1 proceed identically unless F occurs, we have
We claim that
where B ndh is an efficient strong n-DH adversary that makes at most Q h decison oracle queries. Next we detail how B ndh plays the role of the challenger in Game 1 to gain the advantage as claimed. Setup: B ndh is given (X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ) as the n-DH challenge instance. B ndh gives the adversary pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). Note that the only difference between B ndh and the challenger in Game 1 is that the former does not know the sk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Hash oracle queries: Except processes the queries the same way as the challenger does in Game 1, for every random oracle query (Ŷ ,Ẑ 1 , . . . ,Ẑ n ), B ndh sends this tuple to its own decision oracle, and marks it "good" or "bad" accordingly. At the end of the game, B ndh checks if it has seen a "good" tuple of the form (Y, ·, . . . , ·); if so, it outputs the last n components. According to the definition of event F , Equation (8) 
Finally, it is easy to see that in Game 1, the adversary is essentially playing the chosen ciphertext attack game against SE. Thus, there is an efficient adversary B sym such that
Theorem 5.1 now follows by combining (6)-(9).
The n-IBE Scheme
We now present details of the n-IBE scheme. Let G and G T be two cyclic groups of prime order p and G with generator g, and further let the two groups be equipped with a pairing e : G × G → G T . A master public key set is a tuple of n group elements mpk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), where X i = g xi for i ∈ I and I = {1, . . . , n}. The corresponding master private key set is a tuple msk = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), which are selected at random from Z p . We treat the secret/public master key set (msk, mpk) as n separate key pairs (x 1 , X 1 ) , . . . , (x n , X n ), which belong to n Key Generation Centers (KGCs) respectively. This scheme uses a symmetric cipher SE = (E, D) and two hash functions H and G, where G is defined as G × {0, 1} * → G, and H is defined as ({0, 1}
(λ is the length of a symmetric key in algorithm SE).
A private key set associated with n individual identities, denoted by id = (id 1 , . . . , id n ) for id i ∈ {0, 1} * and i ∈ I, is a tuple of n group elements sk = (S 1 , . . . , S n ). The i-th element of sk is
xi . To encrypt a message M ∈ M for id, one chooses y ∈ Z p at random and sets
The ciphertext is (Y, C). To decrypt using sk for id, one computes Similar to the n-ElGamal encryption scheme in Section 5, the length of the ciphertext in the n-IBE scheme is independent to the number of KGCs and identities n. Like the twin IBE scheme of [6] , the n-IBE scheme does not add redundancy to the ciphertext as in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [18] , which, e.g., is used in the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [4] and the Sakai-Kasahara IBE scheme [9, 23] . Now we denote our n-IBE scheme by MIBE nbdh . It holds chosen ciphertext attack security under the strong n-BDH assumption, as shown in Theorem 6.1. By Theorem 3.1, it also means to be secure under the BDH assumption. The theorem can be proved by following the security analysis approach for the twin IBE scheme in [6] (the approach was originally proposed in [21] ). Due to the limited space, we have put this proof in the full paper [8] . 
Conclusions
We have proposed a new computational problem called the n-DH problem, which is an extension of the twin DH problem of [6] , and also proposed the associated strong n-DH problem and the (strong) n-BDH problem. We have shown that the strong n-DH (n-BDH) problem is as hard as the ordinary DH (BDH) problem.
We have introduced a formal definition of n-out-of-n encryption which has two versions, namely MPKE and MIBE for the conventional public key setting and identity-based key setting respectively. We have also proposed an efficient MPKE (MIBE) scheme and proved it is CCA secure under the DH (BDH) assumption. In our security model for an MPKE (MIBE) scheme, the adversary is not allowed to corrupt any individual key in the whole set of n keys, which is used in the challenge phase. This security model suits our target applications of multiple key encryption very well, where the decryption process requires that either a decryptor must holds n keys or that n decryptors much work together. However, whether this model can be strengthened and whether there is any practical motivation to any enhancement of the model might be an interesting topic for further investigation. Whether there are other applications which can benefit from the (strong) n-DH/n-BDH problem is another question which could lead to some future research.
